Brussels has once again made a move in one of the European Union’s most politically sensitive areas: migration. According to an internal document seen by Euractiv, the European Commission is set to present its new asylum and migration strategy for the next five years in February. The central message is clear: tighter border controls, more deportations, and increased pressure on third countries to accept the return of irregular migrants.
The problem is that, once again, Brussels appears to be limiting its ambition to the external and coercive management of the issue, without addressing the structural factors that are profoundly transforming European societies. The result is a patchwork policy designed to ease political tensions in the short term, but incapable of providing a lasting solution.
The strategy would establish six broad priorities: migration diplomacy; strengthening external borders; a “firm and adaptable” asylum system; returns and readmissions; legal pathways for labour migration; and the “strategic” use of financial resources.
In practice, the document consolidates a tougher line that the Commission has pursued since the start of its mandate under the presidency of Ursula von der Leyen. Brussels now insists that effective removals of those with no right to remain in the EU must become the cornerstone of European migration policy. It was high time: along the way, there have been victims of years of indecision, such as the two Europeans murdered in 2023 in the latest act of Islamist terrorism carried out by a migrant who had been denied asylum on several occasions.
Migration diplomacy, and pressure on third countries
The Commission proposes systematically using access to visas, trade agreements, and EU funds as leverage to force countries of origin and transit to cooperate on border management and readmissions.
Existing agreements with Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan are set to be deepened, and Brussels is pointing towards closer coordination even with highly unstable or politically sensitive countries such as Syria or Afghanistan.
Strengthening border control also involves the large-scale digitalization of procedures, the full rollout of major EU IT systems, and the increasing use of advanced technologies — including artificial intelligence — for surveillance, data analysis, and identification.
In this context, the role of Frontex will return to the table in 2026, with a review of its mandate that could significantly expand its powers: from organising returns directly with third countries to increasing its standing corps to 30,000 officers. Council documents already contemplate incorporating drones, cyber-monitoring units, and AI-based surveillance systems.
Returns, safe countries, and legal tightening
Regulatory tightening is another central pillar. Member states have already agreed on their position regarding the new returns regulation, considered the “missing link” of the Migration and Asylum Pact. The text provides harsher penalties for those who refuse to leave EU territory and makes it easier to deport individuals to countries deemed “safe”, even if the asylum seeker has little or no connection to them.
In addition, a common list of seven safe countries of origin has been approved — Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, and Tunisia — whose nationals will be subject to accelerated procedures, based on the presumption that their claims are unfounded.
Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner has described this shift as a “complete change” in the European approach to migration. Yet beyond the tougher controls and the rhetoric of firmness, the plan suffers from a glaring silence. There are hardly any concrete references to education, funding for social policies, housing, cultural cohesion,n or the genuine integration of those already living on European soil.
While Brussels promises better border control, millions of illegal immigrants remain settled in European cities, many of them outside any integration framework, and are placing growing pressure on public services. The Commission implicitly acknowledges the problem but postpones addressing it, trusting that a combination of technology, external agreements, and selective deportations will be enough to calm an increasingly uneasy public opinion.
The European Commission’s new migration roadmap responds above all to an immediate political need: to show that “something is being done.” But by deliberately avoiding a debate on the social, cultural, and educational impact of mass immigration, Brussels once again opts for an incomplete solution.
