Illiberalism Is Not an Ideology—It Is a Common-Sense Revolution

In an article for the Washington Post, the Cato Institute’s Johan Norberg asserts that “a 16-year experiment has yielded none of Viktor Orbán’s stated goals … Orbán has already shown that his vision of illiberal nationalism is a dead end that made Hungary poorer and less free.” 

This critique is emblematic of the broader struggle among political scientists worldwide who are trying to understand and interpret the Hungarian political landscape. Many of these observers remain perplexed, unable to grasp how Orbán has kept his party in power for 16 years, securing four consecutive two-thirds supermajorities. 

However, Norberg’s claims are fundamentally shallow and rely on a misinterpretation of terminology. Viktor Orbán employed the term “illiberal” only once, primarily as a rhetorical tool to explain that his governance was the antithesis of the failing neoliberal mainstream. It was never intended to carry the specific, pejorative weight that Fareed Zakaria assigned to the concept of “illiberal democracy” in the 1990s. Rather than a rejection of democracy itself, Orbán’s framework was presented as a defense of national sovereignty and traditional values against a globalist consensus that he argued had failed the Hungarian people. To evaluate the ‘Hungarian model’ solely through the lens of Western liberal definitions is to ignore the domestic socio-political realities that have consistently validated his mandate at the ballot box.

Therefore, it is a complete misunderstanding of the situation, primarily because the West has never truly grasped the Central and Eastern-European (CEE) perspective. They were carried away by the mainstream 1990s U.S. narrative of “the end of history,” assuming that liberal democracy was the only remaining destination for all nations. However, as Samuel P. Huntington argued, there is always a special national path of development. This divergence is precisely what Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes point out in their acclaimed work, The Light That Failed. They describe the dawn of liberalism’s hegemony and how the liberal West looked down upon the post-Communist space with a sense of moral and intellectual superiority. These nations were promised a seat at the table as equals but were met with condescension, dispossession, and a cold diplomatic realism that effectively classified them as second-class countries. As Krastev and Holmes argue—and this is a crucial observation—these countries eventually reacted to this exclusion by forging their own paths and asserting their specific national interests. This shift toward sovereignty is something the West neither understands nor appreciates.

Furthermore, this shared experience strengthened the ‘differentiated integration’ of the Visegrád Four (V4). This alliance allowed these four nations to cooperate on essential strategic issues, effectively asserting CEE interests in Brussels against a centralized agenda. The climax of this confrontation was the 2015 migration crisis, at which point Hungary became the first and, at the time, the only nation to break from the European canon, prioritizing its own national security and cultural integrity over the demands of the mainstream consensus.

The author attempts to portray ‘illiberalism’ as a rigid, complex ideological model, but this is a fundamental mischaracterization. There has never been an intention to follow or copy external models; in fact, the Hungarian approach explicitly rejects the imitation of foreign blueprints. Instead, what has emerged is a distinct Hungarian model of governance. The true source of friction with the international mainstream is that this model is unapologetically built on conservative foundations: God, Homeland, and Family, with a primary focus on the national interest. The underlying grievance of Western critics is not a lack of democracy, but rather our refusal to simply nod in agreement with the Brussels consensus. As JD Vance noted during his visit to Budapest, Viktor Orbán stood out as a leader who dared to challenge the EU’s centralized overreach. The mainstream narrative suggests a false dichotomy: any political system that does not align with progressive or far-left ideologies is reflexively labeled a ‘right-wing dictatorship.’ We are constantly met with the same tired accusations—that we have dismantled checks and balances, filled every institution with “party soldiers,” and rigged the electoral laws to favor the incumbent. 

There is a profound irony in these claims when viewed against the backdrop of the current political reality. It is particularly humorous to read these critiques of a “stifled democracy” considering the April 12 elections, where the Tisza Party secured a two-thirds majority victory. This democratic shift has dismantled the carefully constructed propaganda of the past decade. If the Hungarian system were truly a rigged autocracy designed to prevent any change in leadership, such a sweeping mandate for an opposition force would have been impossible. 

The author predictably resorts to tropes of “kleptocracy,” yet this ignores the restorative nature of the economic policies enacted since 2010. The government moved to tax and displace those firms and banks that acted as value-extractors, thriving only because post-communist privatization had hollowed out our nationally strategic sectors. Reclaiming these industries was not about enrichment but a necessary stabilization of a national economy previously left vulnerable to global capital. Any claim that these sixteen years yielded no results is a demonstrable lie, especially as Hungary now boasts one of the most extensive motorway networks in Central Europe. Furthermore, we have significantly increased education funding and modernized higher education through the university model change, moving institutions away from rigid ministry control. This transition allowed universities to function as flexible, competitive entities that serve as the beating hearts of their local economic ecosystems. Finally, the massive nationwide program to ensure every student has access to swimming pools and sports facilities proves that the Hungarian government has delivered tangible, material improvements to the lives of the next generation.

Economically, there has been a shifted focus from multinational corporations and foreign banks to Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises. Foreign ownership of major industries was discouraged, and developing Hungarian ownership was prioritized. The government rejected migration as an engine of economic growth, instead building a work-based society focused on integrating marginalized social groups into the workforce, a strategy so successful that the number of people living in poverty in Hungary significantly decreased. Furthermore, spending on education has also grown, with Hungary spending 5.1% of its GDP on human capital, well surpassing the EU27 average. 

Addressing the demographic challenge, the Family Housing Support Program (CSOK) has fundamentally altered family planning trends, supporting young families with subsidies and low-interest home loans, with higher levels to couples who in advance ‘pre-committed’ to having a certain number of children within a set time span. By 2022, the number of ‘pre-committed’ children in housing contracts exceeded 21,000. Data from 2016 to 2022 shows that the number of families making these commitments rose by nearly 76%, with the total number of pre-committed children growing by 79%, increasing the per-family average from 0.51 to 0.63. Should these commitments be fulfilled, the fertility rate among participating families would exceed the 2.1 replacement level, proving the efficacy of a model that combines historic teacher wage increases with robust rural infrastructure and family-centered incentives. The government also implemented the largest increase in teacher wages, building new schools, and preserving the country’s rural settlements by supporting village schools.

While the claims made regarding the economy may be partially true, the author completely neglects the essential context. Funding is being withheld from Hungary for purely political reasons, using the rule of law as a repetitive ‘rubber bone’—a hollow pretext designed to exert pressure. Billions of euros in EU cohesion funds remain frozen as the European Commission continues to target Hungary. 

Tisza and the Commission argued funds are frozen because of systemic state corruption and degradation of the rule of law. However, these punitive actions have more to do with punishing Hungary for conservative stances like refusing to accept mass migration and standing against LGBT propaganda. Surrendering to Brussels to receive these funds would lead to crippling austerity and would dismantle important economic measures such as the utility price caps protecting Hungarian families. 

Furthermore, we are paying €1.2 million daily because we reject the Migration Pact and are unwilling to comply with its mandates. 

Any honest assessment of the Hungarian economic landscape must account for this external financial obstruction, which seeks to penalize the country for its ideological independence rather than any genuine institutional failure. 

Above all, the Hungarian economy was deeply affected by COVID, as was every European country, but the government worked hard to minimize the damages to Hungarians, honoring its “no one is left behind” pledge, with emphasis on the collective responsibility of Hungarians to one another. The pandemic was followed by the Russo-Ukrainian War and its skyrocketing energy prices, driven by misguided EU sanctions. 

The election results were not a judgment on Hungary’s last 16 years of governance but on the hard and unfair last four years. This is not the end of Hungarian conservatism: we have only just started.