The European Union continues to accelerate its trade offensive in Latin America. Following the Mercosur agreement and in the midst of a search for new strategic partners, Brussels has concluded the modernization of its agreement with Mexico—an update that transforms a framework signed more than twenty years ago into a far broader pact: trade, investment, public procurement, digitalisation, supply chains and political cooperation.
On paper, the aim is to reinforce European presence in one of the leading G20 economies and build an economic relationship less dependent on China and less subordinated to the commercial turbulence with the United States.
But, as with almost all European trade agreements, the relevant question is none other than who really wins and who bears the costs. It is the very question that arises with every agreement the Community executive signs.
The European Commission maintains that the main beneficiary will be European industry. The new agreement eliminates a large share of the tariffs still in place on Community exports, and expands the access of European companies to the Mexican market. The most favoured sectors are industrial machinery, automotive, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and advanced manufacturing. That is to say, big industry.
Mexico has become one of the great industrial hubs of North America and an increasingly relevant piece in production chains linked to automotive, electronic components and electric vehicles. For Brussels, gaining deeper entry into that ecosystem means something more than selling products: it implies securing a presence in strategic value chains.
The logic is also geopolitical. The Commission’s “open strategic autonomy” seeks to reduce vulnerabilities in light of the lessons accumulated since the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the growing rivalry with Beijing. Mexico now appears as an alternative platform for diversifying production and securing critical supplies. Brussels speaks of resilience; in less institutional terms, this is about not depending excessively on a single supplier.
There are also clear benefits for part of the European agri-food sector. The agreement eliminates or reduces barriers for exports of pork, dairy, wines, spirits, pasta, cereals and processed products. It also protects hundreds of European geographical indications, shielding brands and high-value-added products.
But here the politically delicate part appears—and it does not vanish into thin air.
European agriculture is going through a particularly sensitive moment. The farming protests of recent years have turned every trade agreement into a terrain of high political tension. Brussels insists that this deal does not replicate the Mercosur framework and underlines that many sensitive agricultural products will be limited through specific quotas and control mechanisms.
But farming organisations have been warning for years that each new agreement gradually broadens competitive pressure on sectors already subject to far higher regulatory costs within Europe.
The problem is not solely one of tariffs. The European farmer or livestock producer operates under growing environmental, sanitary and bureaucratic standards derived from Community legislation. If Brussels imposes certain internal conditions while simultaneously expanding external imports, an uneven competition under different rules will persist.
The livestock sector is one of those observing the agreement with the greatest wariness. Although quotas seek to contain direct impacts, part of the sector fears a cumulative effect. Trade deals with Mercosur, New Zealand, Canada, Ukraine, and now Mexico form part of a trend that particularly concerns European producers: a gradual opening that individually appears limited, but which in aggregate reshapes entire equilibria.
