The European Commission has opened a formal procedure to force Google to share detailed data on searches and user activity within the European Union.
The measure, framed under the Digital Markets Act (DMA), comes in parallel with the rollout of the European digital identity—the EUDI Wallet—which will allow citizens to integrate official documents into their mobile phones from 2027 onwards.
These are two initiatives with different legal bases but converging effects: increasing Brussels’ capacity to structure, supervise and ultimately influence the functioning of the European digital space.
The case opened on April 16, 2026, has a clear objective: to define how Alphabet, Google’s parent company, must share data with third parties in order to comply with Article 6(11) of the DMA. A final decision is expected before July 27.
The data concerned includes search queries, rankings, clicks and views — the raw material that feeds search engine algorithms and, by extension, much of the digital ecosystem.
The Commission is defining five key elements: who can access the data, how much is shared, how it is anonymised, under what economic conditions, and through which technical infrastructures it is distributed.
The official argument is competition: reducing Google’s advantage and enabling new players to enter the market. But the mechanism goes beyond opening the market. It effectively institutionalises data flows under regulatory supervision—in other words, more control by the EU executive.
The question of anonymization
Brussels insists that the data will be anonymised. However, the procedure itself acknowledges the technical difficulty: maintaining the usefulness of the data without compromising privacy.
The Commission is asking companies and stakeholders to assess whether the proposed measures strike that balance or require adjustments. This is a clear indication that the model is not yet fully settled.
In practical terms, the system will depend on how these anonymisation mechanisms are designed and to what extent they can prevent indirect re-identification when combined with other data sources.
Meanwhile, the EU is advancing another key pillar of its digital architecture: the European Digital Identity Wallet. This system will allow citizens to store official documents—ID cards, driving licences and administrative certificates—in a mobile application valid across the Union. Deployment will begin in 2026, with 2027 as the target for widespread use.
The digital wallet will facilitate identification, electronic signatures and access to both public and private services.
Its main advantage is interoperability: a single system valid across all 27 member states. But that same interoperability also implies centralising standards and validation mechanisms at the European level.
The combination of both initiatives reflects a shift in Brussels’ approach. It is no longer just about regulating tech companies, but about designing the infrastructures on which they operate. Access to search data creates a layer of information on digital behaviour. Digital identity creates a layer of verification of who each user is.
Separately, both tools serve functional objectives. Together, they expand the institutional capacity to intervene in the digital ecosystem. This is not an explicit surveillance policy. It is something more structural: building the mechanisms that make supervision possible.
What emerges once again is that Brussels rarely misses an opportunity to extend its reach over citizens—this time under the banner of technological independence from the United States.


