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Two recent rulings by the French Court of Cassation have made it possible to register births resulting from surrogacy in civil records—in defiance of French law. While the law has not officially changed, such court decisions are gradually eroding the substance of the law and advancing an agenda aimed at normalizing a practice that is facing growing international condemnation.
The ban on surrogacy remains enshrined in French law. Article 16-7 of the Civil Code still stipulates that “any agreement concerning procreation or gestation on behalf of another person is null and void.” However, in a landmark ruling handed down on July 3rd, 2026, the Court of Cassation took a new step toward recognizing situations created abroad, ruling that Canadian court decisions establishing the parentage of children born through surrogacy must be recognized in France.
The case involved a French male couple residing in Canada, who had twice used a surrogate mother in that country, where the practice is permitted. Even before the children were born, a Canadian court in Ontario had issued judgments designating the two men as the sole legal parents, with no mention of the woman who carried the children. The parties then asked the French courts to recognize these foreign decisions so that they would take effect in France.
The legal mechanism used is that of exequatur. This procedure does not involve re-adjudicating the merits of the case, but rather allows a decision rendered by a foreign court to be recognized and enforced in France. Until now, French courts have verified that such a decision was not manifestly contrary to French international public policy, which includes, among other things, the fundamental principles of family law.
After being denied at the trial court level, the Paris Court of Appeal granted the same-sex couple exequatur in June 2024. The Public Prosecutor at the Court of Appeal filed an appeal to the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Canadian judgments are “contrary to the French ban on surrogacy”: indeed, how could a decision that gives effect to a practice expressly prohibited by French law be recognized in France?
The Court of Cassation has now ruled that the ban on surrogacy under domestic law is no longer sufficient, on its own, to prevent the enforcement of a foreign judgment. According to the Court, as long as the foreign proceedings provide sufficient safeguards, the rights of all parties have been respected, and the decision was properly rendered, the French court must recognize its effects.
This represents a major legal and political shift, part of a trend in case law that has been underway for more than ten years. Influenced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, French courts have gradually permitted the registration of certain foreign civil status records and then facilitated the establishment of parentage by the intended parent—first through adoption and then, in certain cases, through the direct recognition of foreign decisions. The July 3rd ruling appears to mark a new stage in this evolution.
What sets this decision apart, however, is its scope. It is no longer merely a matter of recognizing a biological relationship or protecting the situation of a child already born. The Court accepts the full recognition of foreign decisions that, from the outset, confer parental status solely on the intended parents, even though this parent-child relationship is the direct consequence of a surrogacy agreement. By issuing such rulings, the Court is creating a body of case law that, de facto, renders the law meaningless.
The stated rationale is the protection of the child’s best interests, as well as the need to ensure the stability of the child’s civil status. The children already have legally established parentage in their country of birth; denying them any recognition in France would create legal uncertainty that could infringe upon their rights, the court argues. But one can legitimately object that the deliberate erasure of the mother does not serve ‘ the best interests of the child.’
As a result of these rulings, the distinction between the ban on surrogacy and the recognition of its effects is becoming increasingly tenuous. In theory, France continues to prohibit any surrogacy agreement on its territory. In practice, when such an agreement is entered into in a country where it is lawful and results in a foreign court decision, that decision can now take full effect within the French legal system, fostering a perverse disconnect between the legal principle and its practical consequences.
The only remaining restriction on surrogacy in France is the inability to enter into a surrogacy agreement on French soil. Such an agreement remains null and void, and no French clinic may offer this practice. The domestic prohibition is still in place, but in terms of principle, France’s stance against surrogacy—which, in theory, is absolute—has been weakened.
In these two cases, the Court of Cassation demonstrates that it is heeding a widespread media trend that tends to portray surrogacy as a harmless, even benevolent, practice, supported by certain political figures such as former prime minister and centrist presidential candidate Gabriel Attal. The July 3rd rulings, however, run counter to recent international positions that equate surrogacy with exploitation harmful to both the mother and the child.
