Frank Furedi’s new book, In Defence of Populism, was presented this Wednesday in Brussels at a particularly timely moment.
Just days after Reform UK’s surge in Britain’s local elections and with AfD consolidating its position in Germany, the debate organised by MCC Brussels became something more than a book presentation; it turned into an open discussion on one of the central questions of contemporary European politics. Is populism a threat to democracy or a democratic reaction to the exhaustion of the traditional political system?
Furedi has spent years challenging the dominant interpretation of the phenomenon, and in his new work he argues that populism may not be a closed ideology but rather a “democratic disposition” born from a pre-existing social demand. “People are looking for a voice; they are looking for a home; they want to be represented,” he said during the event.
The topic quickly became a debate of considerable interest for those in attendance. Euractiv editor-in-chief Matthew Karnitschnig accepted much of the diagnosis regarding the crisis of traditional parties but questioned populism’s real capacity to provide governing solutions. “Populism responds to the corruption of the traditional system, but I’m not convinced it is solving it,” he said. He also added a recurring criticism directed at these movements: “They promise more than they can deliver.”
The exchange reflected a dilemma that is becoming increasingly visible across Europe. For years, much of political analysis interpreted the rise of so-called populist parties as a temporary anomaly: protest voting, short-term anger, or emotional reaction. Yet electoral reality is beginning to point in a different direction. And for now, that reaction appears unstoppable.
Furedi defended precisely that idea. “The growth of populism is a demand-led phenomenon,” he explained. According to his argument, millions of citizens simultaneously began to feel detached from traditional political elites and abandoned by a left that, in his view, had ceased to represent the working classes.
The most interesting moment came when the discussion moved beyond party labels and entered a much deeper cultural question. Furedi spoke about what he described as a “double betrayal”: on one side, elites that had broken with traditional national values; on the other, historic political forces that left broad sectors of society politically unrepresented. “Millions of people began to feel like foreigners within their own societies,” he argued.
Karnitschnig did not reject part of that diagnosis and even acknowledged a degree of media hostility towards these movements: “There is a knee-jerk antagonism towards populism across much of the media,” he said, adding that such hostility can ultimately strengthen those it seeks to isolate. “People no longer trust traditional institutions or the established press.”
The issue matters because the debate no longer revolves solely around specific parties. Across much of Western Europe, the major post-war parties continue losing support while new political forces occupy spaces that a decade ago appeared politically marginal. The paradigmatic case is the French Socialist Party, now effectively absent at the national level.
Furedi closed with a sentence that probably captures the core of his book: “Without the populist impulse, democracy would lose its meaning.”
The thesis can be debated. What appears increasingly difficult is continuing to treat the phenomenon as a temporary episode. The problem for Europe’s elites may no longer be populism itself. The problem is that more and more citizens no longer see it as an exception. Populism is here to stay.
